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Products Liability:
Principles of Justice for the 21st Century
David G. Owent
I. Introduction
Products liability law in recent decades has experienced an
unparalleled explosion of doctrine and litigation.' Why this is so
can be explained in part by the rapid development during this
period of both science and technology, on the one hand, and
manufacturing and marketing on the other, which together have
provided an ever-escalating array of sometimes dangerous prod-
ucts to an ever-widening market of consumers. Another explana-
tion lies in a general shift of attitudes concerning risk, from indi-
vidual to collective responsibility. Changes in attitudes
concerning corporate responsibility no doubt also have helped to
fuel the rapid expansion of products liability law and litigation.2
But whatever factors lie behind the great leap forward, products
liability cases promise to demand an increasingly prominent
place within the judicial system in the years ahead.
Developments in legal doctrine in this area of the law have
tended to move sharply, sometimes one way, sometimes another,
without firm foundations in social or moral theory. Most efforts
to search for principle have been quite unhelpful, and the courts
t Webster Professor of Tort Law, University of South Carolina. B.S. (Wharton
School), J.D., University of Pennsylvania. An earlier version of this essay was presented
as the Dyson Lecture at the Pace University School of Law on March 29, 1990. I am
grateful to Stuart Madden, Jerry Phillips, and Kathryn Sowle for their comments on a
subsequent version. Principles of Pareto superiority suggested that I not ask Patrick
Hubbard to comment on any version.
1. See generally W. KEETON, D. OWEN, J. MONTGOMERY, & M. GREEN, PRODUCTS LIA-
BILITY AND SAFETY - CASES AND MATERIALS ch. 1 (1989).
2. See generally Hans, The Jury's Response to Business and Corporate Wrongdo-
ing, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 177, 195-98 (1989); Priest, The Invention of Enterprise
Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985); Owen, The Intellectual Development of Modern Products Lia-
bility Law: A Comment on Priest's View of the Cathedral's Foundations, 14 J. LEGAL
STUD. 529 (1985).
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and legislatures often have seemed to base their rules on little
more than intuition, mirage, and rhetoric. It would be much bet-
ter if, instead, the rules that will govern products liability into
the twenty-first century were constructed on considered princi-
ples of justice set firmly upon a sound moral philosophy.3
The attempt here is to sketch out some preliminary
thoughts on the moral foundations of products liability law.
First to be examined are the affected things and parties - the
products, manufacturers, victims, and other persons affected by
various products of varying risks. The conventional justifications
of products liability law - compensation, deterrence, and risk-
spreading - are next critiqued. The focus then shifts to the
central inquiry - an examination of several fundamental moral
and social ideals and concepts, with strong foundations in moral
philosophy, that inform the search for principle in devising an
acceptable regime of products liability law. Finally, a tentative
set of products liability principles - based upon the moral
foundations examined previously - is offered for examination
and debate.
II. The Products and the Parties
A. The Products
Products dominate our lives. Most people do not often re-
flect upon the extent to which daily life is built upon, controlled
by, and lived through products of various types. This depen-
dency on products begins from the moment a stereotypical "con-
sumer" awakens in his pajamas to an alarm clock in his house,
the air temperature of which is adjusted by a thermostatically
controlled heater or air conditioner, and continues as he rolls off
his spring mattress and foam pillows (covered by sheets, blan-
kets and pillowcases), to stand upon the polyester carpet cover-
ing a synthetic pad and wooden floor. The consumer may then
don his glasses, bathrobe, and slippers, and proceed to his bath-
3. My inquiry into this topic began in Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Prod-
ucts Liability, 33 VAND. L. REv. 681 (1980) [hereinafter Rethinking the Policies], and
continues in Owen, Freedom and Community in Products Liability Law: Searching for
First Principles (forthcoming). An especially valuable recent exploration is Attanasio,
The Principle of Aggregate Autonomy and the Calabresian Approach to Products Lia-
bility, 74 VA. L. REV. 677 (1988).
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room where he may put to use such products as an area rug, a
light bulb, a light fixture, a toothbrush, toothpaste, water, a
sink, mouthwash, a washcloth, a towel, a toilet, toilet paper, a
water heater, soap, shampoo, powder, a razor, pre-shave lotion,
shaving cream, after-shave lotion, a styptic pencil, a Band-Aid,
facial tissue, a cotton swab, a comb, a brush, and a radio - to
say nothing of the building material products he also "con-
sumed": tile, grout, cabinets, a mirror, a fan, paint, wallpaper,
sheetrock,. two-by-fours, plywood, insulation, wire, pipes, fau-
cets, and electricity. And this is all within the first twenty-five
minutes of popping into a state of conscious awareness of him-
self and the world (of products) around him, and before he even
shuffles back to the bedroom to begin to don his various habili-
ments and ornaments, or out into the kitchen to prepare (with a
stove, and toaster, and knife, and butter) his morning fuel.
Thus, before a person in modern society even thinks about en-
tering the workaday world, to do battle on the freeways, facto-
ries, and offices of life, he has already "consumed" hundreds of
different products - all serving various needs, and all present-
ing various risks.
Throughout each day, we all interact in countless ways with
myriad products. Men and women create tangible
things - machines, chemicals, biologics, fabrics, foods, books,
stereos - to do their work, to protect them, to educate them,
to provide recreation, and to nourish them, in body and in spirit.
Products give to humans an opportunity to assert their individu-
ality, to exercise their separate wills according to their separate
goals, to help them do and become what they choose to do and
be - to help them, protect, define, and nourish their unique
personalities in a world of billions of other persons." Interre-
4. "The point, in justice, of private property is [that it] enhances [the owner's] rea-
sonable autonomy ... ." J. FINNis, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 173 (1980). "The
point of property is ... to provide an external sphere for the operation of the free will."
Weinrib, Right and Advantage in Private Law, 10 CARDozo L. REv. 1283, 1291 (1989).
The idea is Hegel's. G. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT paras. 41, 44, 44A (T. Knox trans.
1949) (1821). A moral system of law respecting freedom, therefore, must provide for the
creation and protection of property rights in products. In its promotion of autonomy, the
state should encourage the production of products, and the protection of property rights
therein, in order to increase the range of options available to consumers. "Autonomy
requires that many morally acceptable options be available to a person." J. RAZ, THE
MORALITY OF FREEDOM 378 (1986).
1990]
3
PACE LAW REVIEW
lating with (using) products (man-made and natural) and other
persons, together with thinking, is how we live our lives. Thus,
the invention, construction, and use of products are, generally
speaking, good activities, and products themselves are good
things.
But as the human mind and body are not perfect, products
may cause suffering as well as happiness. Dynamite can move
boulders in order to build towers; yet it may be used, by acci-
dent or by evil design, to destroy dwellings. Area rugs keep feet
warm, feel good to the toes, and may bring pleasure to the eyes;
but they may also slip and "cause" a broken bone. And so soci-
ety has devised some rules for deciding what (if anything) to do,
when a product turns from good to harm, to deal with the conse-
quences of the harm. Sometimes such harmful consequences fall
initially upon the person who is morally responsible for the
harm, and at other times the initial harm falls upon some other
person. The central purpose of the law of products liability
ought to be to assure that the economic consequences of product
misadventures fall upon those persons who deserve in moral the-
ory to bear the loss.5
B. The Parties
The question of who should "justly" be required to bear the
economic consequences, or "harm," of a product accident thus
should be the ultimate issue in products liability law. The para-
digm parties are the one who made the product - the manu-
facturer - and the one who initially suffers harm - the acci-
dent victim, who often is also the product purchaser and user.
The justice of holding the manufacturer responsible may be
quite clear, as when it conceals a dangerous condition in order to
sell more products.' Sometimes the justice of leaving the harm
upon the victim is self-evident, as when he is cut by flying glass
5. Even the economic theorists understand the need to root the economic analysis of
law in moral theory. See, e.g., Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency
Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980); cf. G. CALABRESI,
THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 24 n.1 (1970) ("[Flairness becomes a final test which any sys-
tem of accident law must pass.").
6. E.g., Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 241 Kan. 441, 738 P.2d 1210 (1987) (manufac-
turer of Dalkon Shield IUD concealed risks of pelvic inflammatory disease and septic
abortions from doctors and consumers).
[Vol. 11:63
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from a bottle he throws against a pole.7 But there are many
more difficult cases between these extremes, cases in which both
the maker and the user proceed in all good faith, and sometimes
both with all due care. It is cases such as these, involving good
faith and, at worst, understandable mistakes, that the rules of
products liability must fairly help to resolve, and it is to princi-
ples of moral philosophy that the rules should look for proper
definition.
Often, perhaps usually, the quest for "the" appropriate
party to bear the loss is complicated by the presence of parties,
other than the maker and the user, who have played a morally
significant role in the misadventure. Rather than the user, the
victim may be another person, often called a bystander, some-
times "innocent" ' and sometimes not." Especially in the case of
a serious accident, losses typically also fall upon the victim's
family,10 friends,1 employer,12 insurers,13 other insureds,"4 ob-
servers,15 and future potential users,16 defendants, 7 and other
7. Venezia v. Miller Brewing Co., 626 F.2d 188 (1st Cir. 1980) (particles of glass
from discarded beer bottle that plaintiff threw against a telephone pole injured his eye).
8. See, e.g., Osborne v. International Harvester Co., 69 Or. App. 629, 639, 688 P.2d
390, 397 (1984) (plaintiff's car struck by defective truck); Garst v. General Motors Corp.,
207 Kan. 2, 484 P.2d 47 (1971) (worker run over by 40-ton earthmover at construction
site).
9. See, e.g., Moran v. Faberg6, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11 (1975) (teenager
burned when friend poured bottle of cologne on candle to "make it scented"; id. at 541,
332 A.2d at 13).
10. E.g., Timms v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 520 F. Supp. 1147 (N.D. Ga. 1981)
(husband's fingers crushed in press); Siciliano v. Capitol City Shows, 124 N.H. 719, 475
A.2d 19 (1984) (parents' children injured and killed in amusement ride).
11. E.g., Kately v. Wilkinson, 148 Cal. App. 3d 576, 195 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1983) (teen-
age girl suffered emotional distress from observing friend's body cut open by propeller of
defective boat).
12. The law generally does not provide protection for the employer's losses, which
are considered "merely" economic. See generally S. MADDEN, PRODUCTS LIAaLiTY ch. 22
(1988).
13. Although the victim's insurers may be subrogated to his legal claims, an insurer
only rarely recoups its entire payout.
14. Insurers, in the long run, generally must pass on at least part of the cost of
claims to insureds through higher premiums. See Epstein, Products Liability as an In-
surance Market, 14 J. LEG. STUD. 645, 651 (1985).
15. Witnesses, for example, to tragic airplane accidents.
16. To the extent that manufacturers pass on to consumers past or anticipated costs
through increased prices.
17. To the extent that the accident costs of one member of an industry affect the
future cost of liability insurance throughout the industry.
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members of society.' 8 Behind the manufacturer lie many persons
affected by the rules of products liability law, from employees
and shareholders to creditors, insurers, and other insureds.
Moreover, there typically are many parties other than a single
"maker" responsible for getting the product to the ultimate user,
from inventors, chemists, engineers, miners, raw material proces-
sors, and component part makers, to advertisers, the media, dis-
tributors, retailers, employers, doctors, disposal contractors, and
sometimes predecessors to these enterprises. Although the moral
responsibility of such parties as these is often attenuated, in cer-
tain circumstances it gains strength - as when the maker of a
defective product is out of business, or beyond the court's long
arm, and when the victim neither used the product nor caused
the harm. The issues of fairness and efficiency in such situations
are subtle and complex and call for rules of liability sensitive to
the fundamental principles of social justice.
III. Failures in the Conventional Justificatory Regime
The conventional goals of tort law generally, and products
liability law in particular, are "compensation," "risk-spreading,"
and "deterrence." 1 9 Although all three might be thought to be
supported by moral footings, none of them can withstand serious
moral scrutiny.Y° Nor do these traditional "policies" of products
liability law help the effort to design meaningful principles or
rules of products liability law. All three goals are explanatory
only, for they merely describe the result of a judgment for the
plaintiff. They are all, thus, fatally "one-directional," in that
they suggest a judgment for the plaintiff in every case.2 As such,
these supposed goals or policies cause more harm than good, for
18. To the extent that the accident requires the use of public services, or disrupts
productivity, or if it results in a lawsuit requiring the use of the judicial system.
19. These probably are the principal orthodox goals of modern products liability
law. There are, of course, other, secondary goals. See Rethinking the Policies, supra note
3. See generally G. CALABRESI, supra note 5, at 24-33.
20. See generally Rethinking the Policies, supra note 3 (critiquing several conven-
tional goals of products liability law).
21. See id. at 704, 709-10. The conventional policies are one-directional with respect
to liability rules. As Stuart Madden pointed out to me, even these policies become "two-
directional" once excuses, based upon. the victim's conduct, are factored into the
analysis.
[Vol. 11:03
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their prominence tends to short-circuit further thought.
As seen above, sometimes it is just for the accident victim to
win a products liability action, but sometimes the defendant
should prevail. The purpose of products liability principles and
rules, then, must be to help determine which party - the
maker or the victim - should in justice win the lawsuit, and
what the damages should be.2 Being descriptive only, and one-
directional, the conventional goals provide no guidance on how
individual cases in justice should be decided.
A. Compensation
Compensation, as a legal goal or policy, is a notion that is
completely devoid of moral content. A judgment for the plain-
tiff, of course, results in compensation to the plaintiff, but this
result is sometimes good and sometimes bad. Surely principles
of justice do not dictate that the products liability plaintiff must
always win and that the defendant must always lose..3
The victim of a product accident, particularly a serious one,
is very likely to be in need of money. But need alone cannot
provide moral justification for requiring one person to compen-
sate another. The fundamental problem in this world, of course,
is that billions of people every day have unmet needs - for
such basic things as food and clothing - yet there simply are
too few resources to go around. If the law is going to order the
payment of money to one needy person, it will have to order
that it be taken from another; and the person from whom it is
taken may be as needy as the person to whom it is given. One
might argue that a product manufacturer, as a large business
corporation, is always less in need of resources than the victim
of a product accident, and that the product maker, therefore,
22. The discussion in this essay principally concerns moral considerations relevant
to the determination of liability for compensatory damages. On the moral underpinnings
of punitive damages, see Chapman & Trebilcock, Punitive Damages: Divergence in
Search of a Rationale, 40 ALA. L. REV. 741 (1989); Harris, Rereading Punitive Damages:
Beyond the Public/Private Distinction, 40 ALA. L. REv. 1079 (1989); Kuklin, Punish-
ment: The Civil Perspective of Punitive Damages, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 1 (1989); Owen,
The Moral Foundations of Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REv. 705 (1989).
23. Empirical studies suggest that plaintiffs prevail in roughly half the cases. W.
KEETON, D. OWEN, J. MoNTGO RY, & M. GREEN, PRODUCTS LIABrLrrY AND
SAFETY - CASES AND MATERiALS 21-25 (2d ed. 1989).
1990]
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always ought to compensate persons injured by its products.
Before this argument slips into the risk-spreading rationale,
which is critiqued later, several of its other weaknesses should
be noted.
One formal problem with a needs-based rationale is that it
is structurally out of place in a private products liability lawsuit.
At least since Aristotle, 4 many theorists have considered that
tort and contract disputes generated by some transaction be-
tween two parties involve principally issues of "corrective jus-
tice," of annulling wrongful gains and losses in the property
holdings of the parties.26 Because this perspective presumes the
legitimacy of the initial distribution of resources between the
parties, the law morally may require the defendant to transfer
property to the plaintiff only if there is some good reason deriv-
ing from the transaction that gave rise to the dispute, and per-
haps from the prior relationship between the parties. That the
plaintiff owns less property than the defendant, or that he could
by some measure put the defendant's property to better use
than could the defendant, are insufficient reasons to destroy the
defendant's entitlements to his own property.2 6 Instead, funda-
mental principles of corrective justice require proof that the de-
fendant wrongfully caused the plaintiff's harm before the de-
fendant may be forced to rectify the harm with compensation.
Limiting judicially ordered transfers of property in this manner
24. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHics 150-57 (J. Welldon trans. 1987) (Bk. 5 chs. 5-
7).
25. Some corrective justice theorists subscribe generally to this apt definition of the
ideal. See Coleman, Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 421
(1982); cf. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U.L. REV. 485 (1989); Kiholm,
Corrective Justice as the Redress of Wrongful Gain, 18 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 267 (1988).
More recently, Professor Coleman has been "inclined to the view that the duty of injur-
ers to compensate their victims is not a matter of justice or of morality, but of utility or,
broadly speaking, deterrence." Coleman, Property, Wrongfulness and the Duty to Corn-
pensate, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 451, 465 (1987).
26. Richard Epstein may well be correct in asserting the necessary priority of a
"baseline of property rights." See, e.g., Epstein, Causation - In Context: An
Afterword, 63 CHI.-KENr L. REV. 653, 664-66 (1987); Epstein, Causation and Corrective
Justice: A Reply to Two Critics, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 477, 501 (1979) ("Ownership and tort
flow from a single conception of autonomy and inviolability."). See also Weinrib, Causa-
tion and Wrongdoing, 63 CH.-KENT L. REV. 407 (1987). See generally supra note 4 and
accompanying text. But see Coleman, Property, Wrongfulness and the Duty to Compen-
sate, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 451, 454-60 (1987).
[Vol. 11:63
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol11/iss1/2
PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE
finds strong support in the Kantian ideal of freedom, discussed
below.
This is not to say that need is not relevant to a right to
resources in a just society, for social justice does require provi-
sion for the most fundamental needs of every person. But such
welfare needs are more fairly and efficiently dealt with as obliga-
tions of the community as a whole, more properly funded by
some form of tax, and based upon the very different principles
of "distributive," rather than "corrective," justice.2 7 Thus, even
when based on an accident victim's need, "compensation" by it-
self is an illegitimate goal in a moral system of products liability
principles.
B. Risk-Spreading
While certain risks should be shared equally in a just soci-
ety,2 8 most risks probably should not. Persons often choose to
encounter certain obvious product risks more or less voluntarily,
in order to promote some objective of their own. For example, a
person may be injured by a power saw, while cutting an old
board filled with nails, when the saw strikes a nail and kicks
back toward his body. When such a risk eventuates in harm,
principles of individual responsibility may require that the vic-
tim personally bear the resulting accident costs, rather than
shifting them onto others who did not benefit from his personal
decision to take the risk. But consumers sometimes passively
and unknowingly confront other product risks, as from toxic
chemicals or defective pacemakers. In contexts such as these,
many persons might well be risk-averse and so choose in ad-
vance to pay a fee to insure against the risk. The question then
becomes how, most fairly and efficiently, the risk should be dis-
tributed - by the manufacturer, through a products liability
27. See, e.g., Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56
N.C.L. REv. 643, 659-61 (1978); Schwartz, Economics, Wealth Distribution, and Justice,
1979 Wis. L. REv. 799, 802-05; Englard, The System Builders: A Critical Appraisal of
Modern American Tort Theory, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 68 (1980); Cane, Justice and Justi-
fications for Tort Liability, 2 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 30, 62 (1982) ("It may be that the
demise of tort law is an inevitable result of placing more and more emphasis on the
individual's responsibilities to society."). Aristotle is the source of the division of justice
into its "distributive" and "corrective" forms. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 24.
28. As, perhaps, the risk of death in war.
1990]
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lawsuit, or by the victim's own first-party insurers, firms that
specialize in spreading risks of injury and in providing health
and disability protection.
The products liability system indeed does serve as a form of
third-party insurance mechanism, in which the manufacturer, at
least theoretically, adds a component to each product's
price - as a kind of insurance premium - to reflect antici-
pated future payouts for liability claims.2 9 Loss-spreading is al-
ways achieved by a plaintiff's verdict in a products liability case,
for the judgment will always be borne at least to some extent by
the shareholders of the company. Assuming as we have that this
distribution is appropriate on moral grounds in some situations
but not in others, loss-spreading loses all power as a moral prin-
ciple, for it points to liability in every case. Even if this struc-
tural deficiency were disregarded, the fact remains that the
products liability system is both highly inefficient and quite un-
fair as an insurance scheme. Its inefficiency is reflected by the
very high transaction costs involved in the processing of claims,
represented by the high costs of litigation for both parties and
the courts.30 It is unfair, as George Priest has noted, because of
the regressive manner in which consumers pay an equal "pre-
mium," as a part of the product's price, yet receive payouts
based on sometimes greatly differing levels of lost income.3s
Coupling a private insurance system, tailored to the particular
needs and wants of individual consumers, to a public welfare
system that provides basic medical, disability, and rehabilitative
support to persons outside the private system, would appear to
be a much fairer and more efficient way of distributing the costs
of accidents.32
29. See generally Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96
YALE L.J. 1521 (1987); Epstein, supra note 14. The system is backed up to a large extent,
of course, by an actual third-party liability insurance system, which itself may be justifi-
able in moral (and economic) theory. See generally K. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: IN-
SURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1986); Schwartz, The Ethics and the Eco-
nomics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 313 (1990).
30. See Priest, supra note 29, at 1556.
31. Id. at 1558-60.
32. See generally Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 558
(1985); Priest, supra note 29, at 1586.
(Vol. 11:63
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C. Deterrence
Products liability judgments are said to have a deterrent ef-
fect, and to some extents they do. Products liability judgments
tend to raise the cost of business for manufacturers, and product
use (and, hence, accidents) should tend to be deterred to the
extent that the increased costs are passed along to consumers as
higher prices.3 4 But this is always true, whether the product is
good or bad, or whether the manufacturer in justice should pay
or not. Thus deterrence, the final conventional products liability
rationale, also suffers from being one-directional, and so in na-
ked form cannot supply a moral basis for liability rules.3 5
What society morally should seek to deter is not the pro-
duction of products generally, but rather the production of de-
fective products, products that are by some measure "bad." And
so deterrence to a point =-. "optimal" deterrence - is good.
The problem here, then, is at least twofold' first, determining
whether a particular product is good or bad; and second, deter-
mining the proper amount of damages that will provide the cor-
rect amount of deterrence. The naked deterrence concept, as the
courts are wont to see it, is premised upon the assumption that
the products to be deterred are bad. Yet the issue of how "defec-
tiveness" should be defined by legal rule is the most central and
difficult question in all of products liability law. By assuming
away the most important issue, the deterrence rationale loses its
moral force. There is a risk, moreover, that any rule or principle
of products liability law will result in too much deterrence, re-
ducing the availability of useful products. 6 To the extent that
excessive deterrence does occur, consumers are deprived exces-
sively of things that help them achieve their goals in life, as dis-
33. Tort law probably has much less deterrent force than was assumed by courts
and tort law scholars a generation ago. See generally Sugarman, supra note 32; Elliott,
Why Punitive Damages Don't Deter Corporate Misconduct Effectively, 40 ALA. L. REV.
1053 (1989).
34. See generally Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1980).
35. This argument concerns only liability rules for compensatory damages, since
even a naked deterrence rationale provides some moral support to liability rules for pu-
nitive damages. See Owen, supra note 22; Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liabil-
ity Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1257, 1282-87 (1976).
36. Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management
in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1985).
1990]
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cussed above.
An unconstrained policy of deterrence is troubling for an-
other reason. A principled theory of products liability law proba-
bly should seek to' take into account a manufacturer's ability to
know that its product is good or bad, for reasons both practical
and moral. The manufacturer is not likely to be much deterred
from selling a product that reasonably appears to be a "good"
one,37 nor would society appear to be much helped by deterrence
of this sort. From the moral standpoint, fairness appears to suf-
fer if even a corporate actor can be held legally accountable for
harm that it could not foresee or guard against, when its actions
reasonably were expected to benefit, not harm, other persons.38
Like the other conventional rationales, the simple notion of de-
terrence provides no help in the search for moral principle in
products liability law.
IV. Searching for Moral Foundations
As the traditional policy bases of products liability
law - compensation, risk-spreading, and deterrence - fail to
provide a moral foundation to support the construction of sound
products liability principles, the inquiry must be directed else-
where. The following discussion considers the relevance of four
sets of moral concepts: (1) freedom and equality; (2) truth, trust,
and expectations; (3) utility and efficiency; and (4) power and
risk control. These sometimes conflicting but often complemen-
tary ideals and concepts are fundamental to the development of
a justifiable system of products liability law based on moral
philosophy.
37. Except to the extent that it may be encouraged to invest more in research before
selling a product with potential, but unknown, risks. See Beshada v. Johns-Manville
Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982). But see Schwartz, Products Liability,
Corporate Structure, and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and the Remote Risk Rela-
tionship, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 689 (1985) (liability for unknown risks reduces number of
firms rather than increasing amount of research).
38. The truth of this proposition would be self-evident if the actor were a human.
While moral theory does not require that corporations be accorded rights identical to
those of human beings, such institutions are owned and operated by humans and so
should be provided with a framework of rules within which to operate that is fundamen-
tally fair. See generally Raz, Legal Rights, 4 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 20 (1984); M.
DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY FOR A BUREAUCRATIC
SOCIETY (1986).
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A. Freedom and Equality
The paramount moral value for the law must be freedom, or
autonomy. If a central purpose of law is to provide a framework
of boundaries defining the scope of appropriate behavior for sep-
arate individuals living together in society, as surely it must be,
then it presupposes that men and women have free will, that
they are by nature free. Freedom is the most fundamental and
important political value in society,39 for it prescribes the moral
right and obligation of each person to exercise his rationality4
and his will to control his destiny, constrained only by a duty to
respect the equal right of others.4 ' This constraint, requiring
persons to accord others an equal right of freedom, involves
equality as an important but secondary 2 aspect of the freedom
ideal. The predominant goal of an advanced society 3 should
therefore be to provide in equal amounts the maximum possible
amount of initial4 freedom to each person.
39. "Freedom (independence from the constraint of another's will), insofar as it is
compatible with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law, is the
one sole and original right that belongs to every human being by virtue of his humanity."
I. KANT, THE MErAPHYSicMAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE (RECHTSLEHRE) *237 (J. Ladd trans.
1965) (1797). Cf. Hegel: "The will is free, so that freedom is both the substance of right
and its goal .... " G. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT para. 4 (T. Knox trans. 1952) (1821);
Rawls' first principle of justice: "[Ejach person is to have an equal right to the most
extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others." J. RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JUSTICE 60 (1971),
40. Freedom has value, and even meaning, only insofar as the person possesses
"minimum rationality, the ability to comprehend the means required to realize his
goals .... " J. RAz, supra note 4, at 373. "Freedom - autonomy - is to be found in
obedience to the moral law, to which reason gives us access. But because each person
achieves autonomy by exercising his own critical, rational faculty, the moral law, though
constraining, is not imposed. ... S. BENN, A THEORY OF FREEDOM 173 (1988). See
generally R. FLATHMAN, THE PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS OF FREEDOM ch. 7 (1987).
41. See supra note 39.
42. Of course, according equality only a weak, secondary role reflects an underlying
preference for freedom as the primary social ideal. Contrast Dworkin, Why Efficiency?, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 563, 570 (1980) (arguing for "deep equality" from which society would
devote an equal share of resources to the life of each member). Strengthening equality
further would tend to weaken freedom, and eventually would force an untoward collapse
of the corrective justice model into one of distributive justice. See supra notes 24-27 and
accompanying text.
43. In a poor, hand-to-mouth society, the need to maximize basic utility (food and
shelter) may sometimes supersede the ideal of freedom.
44. Persons acting freely generally should be able to contract away many of their
freedoms.
1990]
13
PACE LAW REVIEW
If maximizing individual freedom of action in a crowded so-
ciety thus is to be protected by law, the freedom boundaries of
each person will push closely on all sides against the freedom
boundaries of his neighbors. The resulting problem for society is
that persons often extend their freedoms to the point of risking
harm to, and sometimes harming, others. Thus, the problem for
the law is to establish fair boundary definitions' 5 and fair conse-
quences for boundary breaches.' 6
In products liability law, the rules of liability, causation,
damages, and defenses define the freedom boundaries of greatest
import. Putting aside the difficult question of the extent to
which the freedom rights of humans and corporations should be
the same,'7 it may be helpful to examine how the goals of manu-
facturers and consumers coincide and conflict. The manufac-
turer's primary goal in a free enterprise economy is to maximize
its profits, which means to make its products at the lowest possi-
ble cost and to sell them in the greatest possible number at the
highest possible price. Sales and prices may be increased by
making products safer and more useful, which benefits consum-
ers, too. Yet sales and prices may also be increased by convinc-
ing consumers that a product is safer and more useful than it
really is, or by failing to inform them of potential dangers; and
costs may be reduced, at least in the short run, by reducing
safety and utility in nonapparent ways. The consumer's objec-
tive is to buy the cheapest possible product that is most likely to
accomplish his goals as easily and safely as possible. The law
apart, many manufacturers would want to increase sales by sell-
ing cheaper, less safe products to consumers for use in tasks for
which the products are marginally inappropriate and hence may
be marginally unsafe. Many consumers would choose to buy
such a product because of a misperception of the balance of the
product's risks relative to its utility and its costs.' 8 If a consumer
45. Which should be based upon an underlying system of property rights. See supra
note 4 and accompanying text.
46. Nozick's "border crossing" metaphor illuminates the point. R. NOZICK, ANARCHY,
STATE, AND UTOPIA ch. 4 (1974).
47. See supra note 38.
48. It is a fundamental fact that consumers always possess imperfect information on
the risks and benefits of products they buy and use. See Twerski and Cohen, Informed
Decision Making and the Law of Torts: The Myth of Justiciable Causation, 1988 U. ILL.
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were injured while using such a product in such a manner, the
freedom value would not initially appear to help resolve the
question"of who should bear the loss, for both parties in a sense
chose freely to enter into the exchange transaction. This demon-
strates that freedom cannot be viewed as a naked ideal, but that
it must instead be informed by other moral notions.
B. Truth, Trust, and Expectations
To exercise his will rationally, a person must have knowl-
edge of the world around him, which means that he needs to
possess the truth. A person cannot decide rationally whether to
act one way or another - whether to buy product A or product
B, or whether to use product C with a guard or without
one - unless he knows how A, B, and C probably will operate,
the probable risks that each possesses, and his probable ability
to control those risks. Knowledge, the possession of a true con-
ception of how the person and the product will likely interact, is
therefore an important condition to the rational exercise of
freedom.
Yet the possession of the absolute truth is always an unat-
tainable ideal, for the frailties of human perception and cogni-
tion are such that persons can obtain at best only fair approxi-
mations of the truth.49 In striving to foster the ideal of freedom,
then, a primary principle of products liability law should be to
hold the manufacturer accountable for harm caused by represen-
tations about the product that the manufacturer should have
known were untrue. Another principle should be to place re-
sponsibility for a product accident upon the party who had the
best conception of the true balance of risks and benefits inher-
ent in using the product to perform its task. Such principles
would appear to require manufacturers to provide consumers
with material information about predictable risks from predict-
able uses, to permit consumers to exercise their freedom as ra-
tionally as possible, yet would force consumers to take responsi-
bility for the consequences of putting products to uses that are
L. REv. 607, 626-41. Even with perfect information on a product's balance of risks and
benefits, consumers with a preference for risk-taking sometimes would choose to
purchase and use products containing an excess of risks over benefits. Id.
49. See generally id.
1990]
15
PACE LAW REVIEW
unusually adventurous.
These principles flow also from the consumer's expectations,
which are based on trust. The rules of commerce have evolved
over the centuries to the point that the law generally requires a
basic parity in an exchange transaction: a fair product for a fair
price. If a manufacturer withholds important risk information
from consumers, who fairly expected such information to be re-
vealed and reflected in the product's price, the manufacturer has
cheated the consumer out of the truth.5 0 The failure to provide
such information shows disrespect for the dignity of the con-
sumer, for withholding risk information from the consumer de-
prives him of the ability to make an informed choice on whether
to exercise his freedom to buy a particular product, and how to
use it thereafter.51 Much more disrespectful of consumers are
false statements concerning safety that a manufacturer knows or
should know are false. Such statements violate the consumer's
trust that the manufacturer will not deceptively and affirma-
tively place him in greater danger than he reasonably believes to
exist.
Perhaps the most perplexing doctrinal problem in products
liability law today is the question of who should bear responsi-
bility for risks that neither party fairly could expect.52 If a prod-
uct's dangers are both unknown and unknowable at the time of
manufacture, the manufacturer's comprehension of them, and
its ability to prevent them, may be said to be beyond the "state
of the art." In such cases, where neither party had any means to
possess the truth concerning the product's dangers, the law
fairly might revert to the naked freedom model, in Which the
parties exchanged a product that they both (mistakenly) be-
lieved was reasonably safe. As both parties would know that the
possession of absolute truth by either one was unattainable, they
both rationally should choose ex ante to make and price the deal
efficiently, according to their (fair) expectations concerning risks
50. The consumer's loss of his right to truth translates into a loss of safety, or a loss
of the portion of the price he paid corresponding to his safety expectations.
51. See generally Madden, The Duty to Warn in Products Liability: Contours and
Criticisms, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 221 (1987); Kidwell, The Duty to Warn: A Description of
the Model of Decision, 53 TEx. L. REv. 1375, 1408 (1975).
52. See generally KEETON, aT AL., supra note 1, at 409-63; Symposium, The Passage
of Time: The Implications for Product Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (1983).
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of injury known and knowable at the time, rather than including
in the product's price an excessive "premium" for insurance
against such unknown risks as might eventuate in harm ex
post.5" From this perspective," the freedom model thus appears
to place responsibility for unknowable risks on the consumer
rather than on the manufacturer.
If the enriched freedom model for products liability is based
in part on consumer expectations, one must decide what types of
expectations deserve protection." There generally is no good
reason in moral theory for the law to require manufacturers to
protect the high safety expectations of a person with an idiosyn-
cratic aversion to risk. To the contrary, such a person may not
fairly demand to be subsidized by the manufacturer, nor,
through higher prices, by other consumers with normal expecta-
tions. For the manufacturer occupies a kind of legislative pos-
ture in which it must select a level of safety that will approxi-
mate the expectations of most of its "constituents" most of the
time. The expectations of the majority of ordinary consumers
might be termed "fair" expectations, because most consumers
understand and accept the necessity of trade-offs among safety,
utility, and price. But the question of how to determine what
expectations are "fair," beyond the raw notions of consumer per-
ception of truth discussed above, requires a broadening of the
inquiry from truth and freedom to certain very different
concepts.
C. Utility and Efficiency
The search for a moral basis for products liability law now
must turn to the philosophic ideal of utility, and the economic
53. It appears self-evident that persons would choose ex ante to purchase. the form
of insurance that provided the best value for the dollar. On this basis, consumers gener-
ally would choose to purchase first-party health and disability insurance (and contribute
through taxes to a social welfare system) rather than to participate in a more expensive
and less fair third-party liability "insurance" system. See supra notes 29-32 and accom-
panying text.
54. This is only one perspective, of course, on a problem that is exceedingly com-
plex. For a powerful set of arguments favoring enterprise liability for unknowable risks,
see Stapleton, Products Liability Reform - Real or Illusory?, 6 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
392 (1986).
55. See generally Rethinking the Policies, supra note 3, at 707-09.
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goal of efficiency. Unlike Kantian ethical ideals such as freedom,
which contain inherent value in and of themselves, the concepts
of utility and efficiency look forward consequentially to the ef-
fects of acts and rules upon the aggregate welfare and wealth of
the community, respectively. The moral value of an act or rule,
as measured by the utilitarian, depends upon the extent to
which it maximizes total, or average, happiness or utility. Simi-
larly, economic efficiency, as variously defined, concerns maxi-
mizing wealth. And while happiness and utility are very differ-
ent things from wealth, the economic theory of efficiency
provides at least a partial, working tool to help measure and pre-
dict the aggregate, and average, effects of an action or rule
across society.
When the respective freedoms of manufacturers, product
users, and accident victims collide, and when the notions of
truth, trust, and expectations do not provide satisfactory an-
swers to how the conflicts should be resolved, it is often helpful
to turn to concepts of utility and efficiency to obtain another
perspective on the problem. And unlike freedom, truth, and
other moral values that are tremendously difficult to value and
hence to compare, notions of efficiency at least provide one basis
for comparative analysis that sometimes helpfully informs the
resolution of a clash of interests.
So, in products liability law, when a consumer's prior expec-
tations concerning product safety are fractured by an accident,
and the manufacturer did not create the unmet expectations,
principles of utility and efficiency may help define a moral basis
for deciding liability. Stated otherwise, utility and efficiency con-
cepts may help determine in this context which consumer expec-
tations may be considered "fair."
The consumer's actual expectations must give way to fair
and average ones, as discussed above, because the manufacturer
must legislate for consumers as a group the proper mix of safety,
utility, aesthetics, and price. By aggregating (and averaging) the
desires of consumers generally, the manufacturer is forced to
56. See generally Kornhauser, A Guide to the Perplexed Claims of Efficiency in the
Law, 8 HOFSTRA L. Rav. 591 (1980). Cf. Posner, supra note 5, at 507 ("[Einlightened
utilitarianism will incorporate the sorts of constraints that [make] wealth maximization
an appealing ethical norm.").
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disappoint a minority of consumers who possess peculiarly high
expectations of product safety or who are peculiarly risk-averse,
clumsy, careless, or dull-witted. Assuming that the manufacturer
has respected its informational obligations that rest on truth,
the manufacturer should incorporate in the product - upon
principles of utility, efficiency, and autonomy - the types and
amount of safety expected by ordinary persons expected to use
the product. For a consumer's expectations to be fair, he must
accord an equal respect to the probable safety-mix choices that
most others probably would choose ex ante, and such choices
would probably be based upon, first, truth, and, second, effi-
ciency. For even when the choice is between dollars and the risk
of harm to life and limb in ordinary accidents, most persons
might well consent ex ante to the selection of a liability rule that
maximizes wealth,57 at least as a secondary objective.
Even if an injured consumer's expectations of product
safety have been fully met, so that he has no claim for violation
of his right to freedom, utility may have an important role to
play in liability decisions. For the principle of utility dictates
that actors seek to maximize communal welfare and, commensu-
rately, that they seek to minimize waste. So, even if a manufac-
turer and a buyer freely engage in a product exchange transac-
tion with full and equal knowledge of the balance of the
product's risks and benefits, their respective obligations to pre-
vent waste still may have vital moral dimensions. If the con-
sumer suffers injury from an inefficient product risk - one that
was excessive for the benefits achieved - the manufacturer
may be faulted on moral grounds for causing waste. 8 If, instead,
the consumer causes an accident by using the product inef-
ficiently, in a manner or for a purpose known to be improper,
then the consumer is morally responsible - under principles of
utility - for the waste. Economic theorists continue to debate
the efficiency of various rules of liability and defense in various
contexts, and the purpose here is not to join in that debate. It is
57. See Posner, supra note 5, at 492-93.
58. In the ordinary case of this type, however, the buyer may not appropriately be
permitted to recover damages for his own injuries, because he possessed ex hypothesi
full knowledge of the danger and, hence, he must take responsibility for choosing to
encounter it. Nevertheless, the manufacturer in such a case should be liable for injuries
to other persons, on principles of both freedom and utility.
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instead to demonstrate that the principles of utility and effi-
ciency have a proper and important place in a moral system of
products liability law.
D. Power and Risk Control
The final concepts to be considered in this inquiry are
power and risk control. Power is the control that one person has
over another. The power of the first person mirrors the vulnera-
bility of the other. As a person's power increases, so too does his
responsibility to act appropriately to prevent his power from
harming others. Moral theory suggests that "appropriate" action
means according -equal respect to the freedom and other rights
of the vulnerable person."
In the law of accidents, including product accidents, power
is measured by risk control. When the ability to control the risk
lies with the manufacturer, the manufacturer has moral respon-
sibility for subsequent accidents. When the power to prevent an
accident is controlled instead by the consumer, the consumer
has moral responsibility for accident prevention. This principle,
under which the parties who have power over risk control are
morally accountable for accidents, flows naturally from the prin-
ciple of freedom or free will. One can exercise one's will, of
course, only if one has the means to do so. And the means to
control events - the possession of resources, including
truth - are the component parts of power.
So, in general, the party who has the dominant control over
the risk - the party who is in the best position to discover a
risk, and to discover and exercise an appropriate means to pre-
vent an accident - is the party with the greatest moral respon-
sibility to avert the harm. Utility and efficiency also should be
promoted by requiring the best or cheapest cost avoider60 to
bear responsibility for the loss. Responsibility in products liabil-
ity law, accordingly, often rests comfortably in moral theory
59. See Owen, The Moral Foundations of Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REV. 705,
716 (1989). See generally S. BENN, A THEORY OF FREEDOM 125-29, 140-49 (1988) (explor-
ing the relationship between freedom and power).
60. The phrase, of course, is Dean Calabresi's. G. CALABRESi, THE COSTS OF Acci-
DENTS 135 (1970). Dean Calabresi's cheapest cost avoider model is helpfully justified and
elaborated, in terms of moral philosophy, in Attanasio, supra note 3.
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upon the party with the greatest power to avert a product
accident.
One might think initially that the manufacturer would al-
most always have more power than the consumer to avert an
accident, as by improving quality control, design safety, or the
information provided to consumers. Indeed, this is true concern-
ing many products, especially those with subtle dangers, used
properly by consumers. Yet when a consumer chooses to
purchase a product containing an inherent danger that is obvi=
ous and unavoidable, or when he chooses to use a product be-
yond its apparent capabilities, the consumer then has obtained
more power than the manufacturer to control the risk. As an
autonomous person with the capacity for rational thought, and
with responsibility to exercise his will in a morally correct man-
ner, 61 a person who knowingly abuses his greater power of risk
control by using a product improperly insults his human dignity.
If this type of morally irresponsible behavior results in harm to
the consumer, he cannot call upon the manufacturer for com-
pensation without denying the equality of other consumers, who
exercised their wills responsibly to curtail their freedom as to
how they used the product, as well as the equality of the manu-
facturer's shareholders, who invested their savings in an enter-
prise making useful products that were safe for normal use. Such
persons cannot in moral theory be required to subsidize, through
higher prices and lost profits, the selfish and morally irresponsi-
ble consumer.2
V. Reconstructing a Durable Set of Products Liability
Principles
Now that the moral foundations for a system of products
liability law have been set, even if only tentatively, one may pro-
ceed with greater confidence to build a justifiable set of legal
principles. That is what I now propose to do - to extract from
the foregoing discussion of moral values some fundamental prin-
ciples to guide decisionmaking in products liability lawsuits. The
61. "Autonomy is valuable only if exercised in pursuit of the good." J. RAZ, supra
note 4, at 381.
62. See Holford, The Limits of Strict Liability for Product Design and Manufac-
ture, 52 TEx. L. REV. 81, 89 (1973).
1990] -
21
PACE LAW REVIEW
principles that follow are preliminary, and the explanatory justi-
fications here are tentative and brief. Yet the effort must start
somewhere,6" and here it is:
PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE
1. Manufacturers should tell the truth about product
dangers.
2. Manufacturers should make products as safe as rea-
sonably possible.
3. Consumers should use products as safely as reasbna-
bly possible.
PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY
1. Manufacturers should be responsible for foreseeable
harm caused by their misrepresentations.
2. Manufacturers should be responsible for foreseeable
harm caused by production defects.
3. Manufacturers should be responsible for foreseeable
harm that reasonably could have been prevented by (a) de-
signing out unreasonable dangers, or (b) providing danger
information.
4. If foreseeable harm cannot be reduced to a reasona-
ble level by redesign or the provision of danger information,
and if the harm is likely to be unexpected by consumers or
excessive when balanced against the product's benefits, the
manufacturer should be responsible, and the product
should be banned.
5. Users should be responsible for foreseeable harm
caused by product uses that they should know to be unrea-
sonably dangerous.
These principles of justice and liability flow logically from
the foregoing discussion of moral theory. The first principle of
justice is the most powerful, for it demands that manufacturers
provide the most important (and often cheapest) resource to
63. It is continued in another essay, which is now in progress: Owen, Freedom and
Community in Products Liability Law: Searching for First Principles (forthcoming).
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consumers to permit them to exercise their free wills rationally
and to make their own important choices for themselves as indi-
viduals. Knowledge is power, and the truth shall make consum-
ers free.
The first two principles of liability follow from the manufac-
turer's obligation to tell the truth - the first principle, self-evi-
dently, and the second principle because the product's safe ap-
pearance belies the presence of hidden and dangerous
production defects. The second principle of liability derives also
from the notions of power and risk control, and often from util-
ity and efficiency, for the manufacturer always is in a better po-
sition than the consumer to prevent production defects, and
often is in a better position to discover them.
The second principle of justice does not reflect an absolute
moral imperative, as does the first, but, like the third, is instead
a principle of balance. Once the manufacturer truthfully has dis-
closed all material risks that are knowable, its obligation rests on
reason - to produce a product with the best mix of safety, util-
ity, aesthetics, and cost. This design mix requires a considera-
tion of consumer expectations concerning safety, but also con-
cerns the other three components of the mix, which may be no
less important to consumers. Utility, practicality, and freedom
require that manufacturers make these design decisions legisla-
tively for typical consumers and typical types of product use.
The third and fourth principles of liability derive largely
from the second principle of justice. Ordinarily, of course, the
manufacturer has the power to design out product hazards, and
it is bound to do so on principles of utility if the apparent risks
exceed the commensurate loss of utility. This is also expected by
consumers, who have a right to trust manufacturers to exercise
their legislative power rationally, fairly, and with respect for the
consumer's right to freedom from wasteful product risks. The
manufacturer's obligation to warn of product dangers is simi-
larly justifiable, as it also is under the first principle of justice
concerning truth. The fourth principle of liability is one of bal-
ance, like the third, but addresses products that contain hazards
that cannot be eliminated and are morally excessive under the
former principles. The manufacturer, of course, must bear re-
sponsibility for harm caused by such "outlaw" products, which
also should be banned.
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The final principles of both justice and liability concern the
moral responsibility of consumers. Product accidents typically
are a function of choices made by both manufacturers and con-
sumers. When the primary power over risk control shifts to the
consumer, who then knows more than the manufacturer about
the risks of using a certain product with certain characteristics
in a certain way, the moral responsibility for resulting harm
shifts at least in part to the consumer, too. The consumer has no
moral claim to force others to bear the harmful consequences of
his actions taken in derogation of his dignity as an autonomous
human being. For the freedom right possessed by consumers
contains within itself the responsibility to act rationally and
with due respect for the freedom right of other persons.
VI. Conclusion
Products liability law has too long foundered on policy ba-
ses devoid of moral content. It therefore should be no wonder
that the liability issues have proved so perplexing to courts and
legislatures and that the rules of law have developed aimlessly.
It is time to inject moral principle systematically into this in-
creasingly important field of law.
Moral foundations for a sound system of products liability
law must first be set. Four sets of concepts provide just this sort
of bedrock: freedom and equality; truth, trust, and expectations;
utility and efficiency; and power and risk control. Principles of
justice and liability can then be constructed upon moral foot-
ings, with at least some confidence in their justifiability. Princi-
ples of justice and liability should not be specific, for they.
should serve only as guiding principles - that in specific cases
may conflict - rather than as rules of law.64 The principles of-
fered here are intended to provide a justifiable framework for
decisionmaking, reflecting the relevant values that lie beneath,
and within which a morally supportable system of rules may be
developed. Much more thought must be devoted both to the
principles of products liability law and to the underlying moral
concepts. But it is time to start the dialogue, and the game is
now afoot.
64. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY ch. 2 (1977).
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